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Analyses of the political economy of exchange-rate policy posit that firms and individuals in different 
sectors of the economy have distinct policy attitudes toward the level and the stability of the exchange rate. 
Most such approaches hypothesize that internationally exposed firms prefer more stable currencies, and 
that tradables producers prefer a relatively depreciated real exchange rate. Sensible as such expectations 
may be, there are few direct empirical tests of them. We offer micro-level, cross-national evidence on 
sectoral attitudes over the exchange rate. Using firm-level data from the World Bank’s World Business 
Environment Survey (WBES), we find systematic patterns linking sector of economic activity to exchange-
rate policy positions. Owners and managers of firms producing tradable goods prefer greater stability of the 
exchange  rate:  in  countries  with  a  floating  currency,  manufacturers  are  more  likely  to  report  that  the 
exchange rate causes problems for their business. With respect to the level of the exchange rate, we find 
that tradables producers – in particular manufacturers and export producers – are more likely to be unhappy 
following an appreciation of the real exchange rate than are firms in non-tradables sectors (services and 
construction). These findings confirm theoretical expectations about the relationship between economic 
position and currency policy preferences. 
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 Introduction 
As in other areas of public policy, governments’ choices of exchange-rate policies 
are conditioned by the preferences of their constituents.  The nominal exchange rate 
regime and the level of the real exchange rate can have powerful effects on the private 
sector, and economic agents want government policies that favor them.  A government 
that ignores its constituents’ concerns about the exchange rate will come under pressure 
to change course.  Indeed, some of the most dramatic events in the history and recent 
experience of exchange rate policy have to do with the preferences of social groups:  how 
they changed, conflict among them, how strong they are.  The battle over gold in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century – whether in the United States in the 1890s, the 
United Kingdom in 1925, or in Latin America throughout – was largely about which 
groups and sectors of the economy were likely to win, and lose, from being on the gold 
standard (Hefeker, 1995; Frieden, 1997; Broz, 1997; Eichengreen, 1992; Simmons, 1994).  
So too did the process of European monetary integration implicate powerful interests on 
both sides of the issue, as it continues to do in the accession countries of Eastern and 
Central Europe and the former Soviet Union (Eichengreen and Frieden, 1993; Frieden, 
2002).  Modern currency crises often begin with a government immobilized by 
contending demands to sustain a fixed rate and to devalue (Klein and Marion, 1997; 
Frieden, Ghezzi and Stein, 2001; Leblang, 2002).  Devising a politically viable policy 
response to exchange-market developments – including real appreciations and attacks on 
currencies – has proved extraordinarily difficult for governments from Argentina to 
Russia.     3 
Just as it is important for policymakers to address the attitudes of powerful 
constituents toward the exchange rate, it is important for scholars to understand what 
these attitudes are and how they are expressed.  Nonetheless, there is very little 
systematic empirical work on the policy preferences of major economic agents.  While 
papers by Collins and Giavazzi (1992), Gärtner (1997), Gabel (1998), and Scheve (2004) 
address related macroeconomic topics – differences in individual attitudes toward 
inflation, the euro, and global economic integration – there is little work that directly 
addresses the exchange rate attitudes of business owners operating in different sectors of 
the economy.  By contrast, there is a large body of work that examines sectoral and 
factoral attitudes toward trade policy (Balistreri, 1997; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; 
Beaulieu, 2002; and Rodrik and Mayda, 2005). 
This paper exploits a large cross-national survey, the World Bank’s World 
Business Environment Survey (WBES), to try to uncover the relationship between the 
economic activities of firms and their owners’ and managers’ attitudes toward the 
exchange rate.  The survey tells us only the extent to which corporate respondents 
regarded the exchange rate as ―a problem,‖ which in itself is of limited use.  However, we 
also know the currency regime prevailing in the country at the time of the survey, the 
level of the real exchange rate, and many things about the firms in question.  By relating 
the prevailing exchange rate policy and the firm’s economic characteristics to how 
―problematic‖ the currency is perceived to be, we can draw inferences about the sources 
of attitudes toward the exchange rate.   
We start with expectations from the theoretical literature on currency policy 
preferences.  With respect to the exchange rate regime, we expect firms with substantial   4 
cross-border exposure to be particularly sensitive to currency volatility, and thus to be 
more satisfied with a fixed exchange rate.  With respect to the level of the real exchange 
rate, we expect firms in the tradables sectors to be more satisfied when the currency is 
weak and more dissatisfied when it is strong.    
We find, indeed, that owners and managers of internationally-oriented firms 
prefer greater stability of the exchange rate: in countries with a floating currency, 
manufacturers are more likely to report that the exchange rate causes problems for their 
business than are producers of nontraded goods and services, who typically do not require 
foreign exchange.  With respect to the level of the exchange rate, we find that exporters 
and manufacturers are more likely to be unhappy following an appreciation of the real 
exchange rate than are firms in domestically-oriented non-tradable sectors (services and 
construction).  These findings conform to expectations about the cross-sectoral 
distributional effects of exchange rates. 
Exchange rate policy, politics, and policy preferences 
The exchange rate is centrally important to economic activity, and government 
policy has a powerful impact on the currency.  After all, the exchange rate is the single 
most important price in any economy, and it is a price that is routinely set, or at least 
targeted, by many governments.  There is an enormous literature on appropriate currency 
policy, but unlike in the case of trade or fiscal policy, there is no simple welfare 
benchmark, so that debates typically involve different weightings of the tradeoffs 
inherent in exchange rate policy choices.  Supporters of flexibility confront opponents of 
volatility, while those who value the credibility and predictability of a fixed rate square 
off against those who dread its rigidity.  A strong currency provides a powerful tool   5 
against inflation, and boosts national purchasing power; a weak currency gives national 
producers great incentives to sell into world markets.  To paraphrase Jeffrey Frankel, no 
single currency policy is right for all people (Frankel 1999).   
Exchange rate policy is constrained by contending economic interests and policy 
preferences, which makes it important to understand those interests and preferences.  A 
theoretical literature deduces these attitudes from the distributional consequences of 
various regime arrangements predicted by economic theory (Frieden, 1991), while 
empirical analyses have imputed attitudes indirectly from actual currency policies and 
legislative and other voting behavior (Eichengreen, 1995; Frieden, 1997; Frieden et al. 
2001; Frieden, 2002).  But scholars have rarely been able to find ways of directly 
mapping economic position to exchange rate policy preferences. 
There are two relevant dimensions of variation along which preferences may 
vary:  on the regime by which the currency is managed, and on the level of the currency.  
In the first instance, the issue is whether to float or fix the exchange rate – and if to float, 
in which of the many possible ways.
4  In the second instance, assuming the currency is 
not fixed, the question is the desired level of the real exchange rate.
5  There is always the 
option to let the currency float completely freely, although developing countries have 
shown themselves reluctant to do this (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002; Levy-Yeyati and 
                                                 
 
4 Obviously, policymakers have a wide choice of regime, ranging from a completely free float to a variety 
of managed floats, degrees of fixity ranging from a target zone to a peg, and a currency board of 
dollarization. This discussion focuses on the extremes—hard pegs and pure floats—however, because the 
analysis of intermediate cases flows from the extremes, and the tradeoffs described apply to the 
intermediate choices, albeit never as starkly as to the extremes. 
 
5 Under most regimes a government must decide whether it prefers a relatively appreciated or relatively 
depreciated currency. Free floats are rare, and by the same token, countries that opt for a pegged regime 
always have the choice of abandoning the peg. 
   6 
Sturzenegger, 2005). On both dimensions, the attitudes of economic agents are likely to 
differ. 
Attitudes toward the exchange rate regime:  stability and credibility or policy 
flexibility?  In an open economy, the main advantage of a fixed-rate regime is to lower 
exchange-rate risk and transactions costs that can impede international trade and 
investment.
6  Volatile exchange rates create uncertainty about international transactions, 
adding a risk premium to the costs of goods and assets traded across borders. In addition, 
an exchange rate peg can enhance monetary-policy credibility. Both theory and evidence 
suggest that fixing the exchange rate to the currency of a low-inflation country both 
promotes international trade and investment and disciplines monetary policy by providing 
an observable nominal anchor.
7 
  But fixing the exchange rate requires that the government sacrifice its capacity to 
run an independent monetary policy.  A floating exchange rate, on the other hand, has the 
great advantage of allowing a government to pursue an independent monetary policy. 
This independence provides flexibility to accommodate foreign and domestic shocks, 
including changes in the terms of trade and world financial conditions, and to affect the 
competitiveness of (relative prices faced by) the tradable goods sector. 
  In an open economy, then, economic agents confront a tradeoff between two 
competing sets of values. On the one hand, a fixed rate brings stability and credibility; on 
the other hand, it sacrifices flexibility.  
                                                 
 
6 Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1962), Kenen (1969); a more recent survey is Tavlas (1994). 
 
7 See for example, the empirical results in Frankel (1995), Rose (2000), Vegh (1992), and Ghosh et al. 
(1997). 
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  The different valuation of this tradeoff depends largely on the extent to which the 
economic actors are engaged in international economic activity (Frieden 1991; Hefeker 
1997).  Those heavily involved in foreign trade and investment – typically including 
exporters, international investors, the commercial and financial sectors, and those with 
substantial foreign-currency liabilities – should favor exchange rate stability, since 
currency volatility is an everyday concern that makes their business riskier and more 
costly.  By the same token, these groups care less about a loss of national monetary 
autonomy, since they typically do business in several countries, and can shift business or 
assets abroad if domestic conditions become unfavorable.  
  By contrast, groups whose economic activity is confined to the domestic economy 
benefit from a floating regime.  The nontradables sector (services, construction, transport) 
belong in this camp.  They are not required to deal in foreign exchange and so are free of 
the risks and costs of currency volatility.  They are highly sensitive to domestic 
macroeconomic conditions and thus favor the national autonomy made possible by 
floating. 
  Tradables producers may have reasons to oppose a fixed rate, as it eliminates the 
possibility of a depreciation to maintain or restore the competitiveness of tradables 
producers.  This raises the second issue, the level of the real exchange rate. 
Attitudes toward the level of the exchange rate.  The real exchange rate affects the 
relative price of traded goods in both local and foreign markets.  There is no clear 
economic-efficiency argument for or against any particular level.  A strong (appreciated) 
currency gives residents greater purchasing power, but also entails a loss of 
competitiveness for tradables producers.  A real appreciation benefits consumers of   8 
imports and harms producers of goods that compete with imports (and exporters).  So 
tradable (import-competing and exporting) industries lose from a currency appreciation, 
while domestically oriented (nontradable) industries and domestic consumers gain.   
Of course, a real depreciation has the opposite effects, stimulating demand for 
locally produced tradable products, but raising the prices consumers pay for foreign 
goods and services.  Currency depreciations help exporting and import-competing 
industries at the expense of domestic consumers and producers of nontraded goods and 
services. 
Thus the level of the exchange rate, too, involves two competing goals – 
stimulating local tradables producers, and raising local purchasing power.  The benefit of 
increasing the competitiveness of national producers comes at the cost of reducing the 
real income of national consumers, and vice versa. 
Two issues complicate theories of exchange rate policy preferences.  First, 
exporters are likely to be torn between a concern for currency stability, on the one hand, 
and a concern for a favorable level of the exchange rate, on the other.  These two 
concerns conflict, inasmuch as a fixed rate rules out adjusting the nominal exchange rate 
to improve the competitive position of exporters.  Whether exporters favor stability over 
competitiveness, or vice versa, is likely to depend on such factors as the price sensitivity 
of consumers of exports, the ability of exporters to hedge against currency volatility, and 
so on.  Second, and closely related, is the fact that tradable producers’ concern about 
currency movements depends upon how directly they are affected by changes in the 
exchange rate, which is a function of such things as pass-through, currency invoicing, and 
the importance of imported inputs (Devereux and Engel, 2002; Campa and Goldberg,   9 
1997; Campa and Goldberg, 2005).  Generally, both exporters and import-competers in 
industries with high pass-through are more sensitive to the relative price effects of 
currency movements than those with low pass-through, since their prices respond more 
directly to changes in exchange rates.  The policy preferences of exporters, in particular, 
are thus likely to be contingent on a large number of factors, which makes the issue 
largely an empirical one.  In both instances, the extent to which concern about volatility 
is more important than concern about the level of the exchange rate is largely an 
empirical question. 
  A simplified picture of the expected preferences of firms would include:  
  Internationally exposed firms, including tradable producers will prefer greater 
currency stability, hence a fixed exchange rate. 
  Tradables producers will prefer greater competitiveness, hence a depreciated 
currency. 
In what follows, we assess the empirical relevance and accuracy of these expectations in 
a large, cross-national survey of firm managers and owners. 
Data and Methods 
To analyze attitudes toward the exchange rate, we use data from the World Bank's 
World Business Environment Survey (WBES).
8  The WBES was administered to owners 
and managers of over 10,000 firms in 80 countries in 1999, applying a common survey 
instrument to a representative sample of at least 100 firms in each country.  We look at 
individual responses to the following question: "How problematic is the exchange rate for 
the operation and growth of your business?" Responses varied along the following 
                                                 
 
8 For a discussion of the WBES project, see Batra, Kaufmann, and Stone (2003). 
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ordered scale: 1 = "No Obstacle," 2 = ―Minor Obstacle,‖ 3 = ―Moderate Obstacle,‖ 4 = 
"Major Obstacle."  These individual responses represent the dependent variable of our 
analysis, which we will refer to as EXCHANGE RATE PROBLEM. 
  The variable EXCHANGE RATE PROBLEM exhibits significant variation both 
across and within countries.  The average value of EXCHANGE RATE PROBLEM is 
2.55, which indicates that the exchange rate represents a nontrivial consideration for the 
average business.  The average response in Chile of 2.53 is closest to the overall mean 
response.  Hungary represents the lowest country average (1.61); managers in Ecuador, 
by contrast, were most likely to view the exchange rate as an obstacle to their business 
(3.74).  This is understandable since Ecuador suffered a serious economic crisis in 1999. 
On the brink of hyperinflation and immersed in a deep financial crisis, Ecuador 
abandoned its currency in January 2000 and adopted the U.S. dollar as its legal tender.  
The average response in Thailand is also notably high at 3.63, which reflects the turmoil 
caused by the collapse of the baht in 1997 and the subsequent Asian financial and 
currency crises.  The overall standard deviation of EXCHANGE RATE PROBLEM is 
1.16, the between country standard deviation is .60, and the within country standard 
deviation is 1.00.  Table 1 reports overall summary statistics.  Tables 2a and 2b are the 
correlation matrices for our firm- and country-level data. 
  We want to assess how the respondent firms’ sectors, conditioned by the 
country’s exchange rate regime and the level of the real exchange rate, affect attitudes 
toward the currency.  For this purpose, we need to classify countries by exchange rate 
regime.  We employ two widely used classifications of de facto exchange rate regimes: 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005), and Reinhart and Rogoff (2004).  Although these   11 
classification schemes differ in details, both attempt to capture the actual behavior of the 
exchange rate.  Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, henceforth ―LYS,‖ categorize countries as 
floats or pegs according to observed changes in the nominal exchange rate, the volatility 
of these changes, and the volatility of international reserves.
9  Reinhart and Rogoff, 
henceforth ―RR,‖ exploit the conditional probability of the exchange rate staying within a 
given range over a rolling five year window, and use information about parallel (dual 
market) exchange rates in determining whether a regime continues from one year to the 
next.  Our results are largely robust to these alternative regime classification 
technologies. 
In Tables 3a and 3b, we report all our data by country according to the LYS 
―floating‖ and ―pegged‖ exchange rate regime classifications.  Table 3c provides a 
comparison of LYS and RR regimes in 1999, the year the WBES survey was 
administered.  Note that RR classifies Indonesia as having a floating regime in 1999 
while LYS do not.  We drop Indonesia from the RR float sample because, in the 
aftermath of the currency crisis, firms from all sectors would likely express 
dissatisfaction with the exchange rate.  Indeed, the standard deviation of EXCHANGE 
RATE PROBLEM in Indonesia is .95, while its average value of 3.54 is one of the 
highest overall.  Sectoral differences may be difficult to discern in this environment.  A 
similar logic applies to Thailand and the Philippines, but since LYS and RR are 
consistent in their classification of these countries as floating exchange rate regimes, 
inclusion of these countries will affect the two samples in the same way.  
                                                 
 
9 Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger include an ―intermediate‖ category which we omit from our analysis 
because we have no strong theoretical priors about business elites’ attitudes in these regimes.   12 
Figures 1 and 2 provide preliminary comparisons of managers’ concerns about 
the exchange rate across these regimes. Overall, managers report more problems with the 
exchange rate in floating regimes than managers operating under pegged exchange rates.  
According to the summary data in Figure 1, the average response among managers in 
floats is 2.78 versus 2.04 for managers in fixed regimes.  Figure 2 shows that 36% of 
managers in floating regimes find the exchange rate to be a ―major obstacle‖ to their 
businesses while only 13% of managers in pegged regimes report the same level of 
concern.  These distributions reveal that, ceteris paribus, managers find pegged regimes 
less problematic than floats. 
We want to test the hypothesis that internationally exposed firms prefer greater 
currency stability, and hence a fixed exchange rate.  To do so, we need firm-level proxies 
for ―international exposure‖.  The WBES asks respondents several questions about the 
characteristics of their firms; most important for our purposes, firms are asked to identify 
the sector in which they operate: manufacturing, service, agriculture, or construction.
10  
In a separate inquiry, managers are asked whether their firms export (yes or no).
11  We 
use these responses to create three unique proxies for international exposure. 
MANUFACTURING takes on a value of 1 if the firm operates in the manufacturing 
sector; TRADABLE is a dummy variable for firms in either manufacturing or agriculture; 
EXPORTER indicates that the firm exports at least a portion of its production.  As noted 
                                                 
 
10 We drop all firms identifying themselves as ―Other.‖ 
 
11 Respondents that indicated they were exporters were also asked to specify the percentage of exports to 
total sales. Unfortunately, most firms did not respond to this inquiry and we are constrained to use a 
dummy variable to indicate whether a firm exports or not. 
   13 
in Table 2, EXPORTER correlates significantly with MANUFACTURING at .33 and 
with TRADABLE at .31.   
  A preliminary review of the data reveals variance across sectors in the degree to 
which exchange rate stability matters for firm managers.  Figure 3 illustrates the average 
response among manufacturing firms versus that of non-manufacturing firms in floating 
and fixed exchange rate regimes.  Manufacturers, on average, express greater discontent 
under floating regimes: the average response among manufacturing firms is 2.89 
compared to 2.67 for non-manufacturers.  Although the average response is lower for 
both groups in fixed-rate regimes, the difference between the two groups is much lower 
in fixed-rate regimes; in fact, manufacturers are slightly happier than non-manufacturers 
in fixed regimes (average values of 1.99 and 2.05, respectively). 
Figure 4 compares the distribution of responses between manufacturing and non-
manufacturing firms operating in floating exchange rate regimes.  Manufacturers express 
more dissatisfaction with exchange rates under floats than respondents operating non-
manufacturing enterprises.  Later, we will use more regression analysis to determine if 
other factors contribute to these differences, but this preliminary evidence suggests that 
international exposure contributes to a preference for exchange rate stability among 
businesspeople. 
  Our next hypothesis relates to the level of the exchange rate, which we measure 
by the variable REER APPRECIATION; the percentage change in the real effective 
exchange rate between 1999 and 1998.
12  Positive values indicate a real appreciation of 
                                                 
 
12 The data are from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) and the Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS). The World Development Indicators provide data for Georgia, but coverage ends at 1998. Therefore,   14 
the currency.  We expect firms in the tradables sectors to be more concerned about the 
exchange rate as the real exchange rate appreciates.  To evaluate this conditional 
proposition, we make use of interactions between our sectoral dummies and REER 
APPRECIATION. 
  Survey responses may reflect other firm- or country-level characteristics besides 
international exposure and sector of activity.  We use the responses to two other WBES 
questions to control for firm-level factors: government ownership and firm size.
13  We 
also include several country-level variables in our models: the log of GDP per capita, the 
log of FDI stock per capita, and financial sector liabilities (M3/GDP). 
  Our first set of models aims to identify firm owners’ concern with the stability of 
the exchange rate.  We estimate the following equation: 
 (EXCHANGE RATE PROBLEM)ij = α + β1 (SECTOR)ij + β2 (FIRM)ij + β3 
(ECONOMY)j + εij   (1) 
where the subscripts stand for firm i in country j.  The dependent variable is 
EXCHANGE RATE PROBLEM, the response of firm i in country j.  We divide the 
sample of responses according to the type of exchange rate regime under which the firms 
operate: floating or pegged.  The variable of interest is SECTOR, which represents one 
of the following sectoral dummies: MANUFACTURING, TRADABLE, or EXPORTER.  
The vectors FIRM and ECONOMY are firm- and country-level controls. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
REER APPRECIATION for Georgia measures the percentage change in the real effective exchange rate 
between 1998 and 1997.  
 
13 Government ownership is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a respondent indicates state 
ownership.  Firm size is an ordered response: 1=small (5-50 employees); 2=medium (51-500 employees) 
3=large (>500 employees).   15 
  To test our claims about sectoral attitudes toward the level of the exchange rate, 
we run interactions between the sectoral dummies and REER APPRECIATION.  These 
models take the following form: 
 
(EXCHANGE RATE PROBLEM)ij = α + β1 (SECTOR)ij + β2 (SECTOR*REER 
APPRECIATION)j + β3 (FIRM)ij + β4(ECONOMY)j + εij   (2) 
 
where the subscripts stand for firm i in country j.  The dependent variable is 
EXCHANGE RATE PROBLEM, the response of firm i in country j.  As before, we 
divide the sample of responses according to the type of exchange rate regime under 
which the firms operate: floating or pegged.  SECTOR represents one of the following 
sectoral dummies: MANUFACTURING, TRADABLE, or EXPORTER.  The variable of 
interest is the interaction SECTOR*REER APPRECIATION.  We expect 
internationally exposed firms to be more concerned about the exchange rate as the real 
exchange rate appreciates.  FIRM and ECONOMY are vectors of firm- and country-
level controls. 
Since our dependent variables are discrete, ordered responses, we estimate the 
equation with ordered probit models using standard maximum likelihood and 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.  Following Beck et al. (2006), who model a 
different WBES survey response as a function of firm- and country-level variables, we 
allow for possible correlation of the error terms among firms within the same country 
using Stata’s ―cluster‖ command.  This technique maintains the assumption of   16 
independent error terms across countries, while allowing for within-country correlation of 
the errors due to factors such common linguistic or cultural interpretations of the survey. 
To the extent that a government's choice of exchange rate policy is influenced by 
the pressures of sectoral interest groups, as we believe, endogeneity bias is an obvious 
concern.  For example, where manufacturing composes a large share of GDP, 
governments may be particularly responsive to manufacturers when setting exchange rate 
policy. But if the causal arrow runs unambiguously from firms' preferences to exchange 
rate policies, the bias works AGAINST our finding sectoral differences in the data.  That 
is, if manufacturers obtain the exchange rate policies they want, we should not observe a 
difference in the responses of manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms. Thus, our 
results are likely to understate the effect of endogenous exchange rate policies on firms' 
attitudes.  
Results 
Tables 4-7 contain estimates of the covariates of exchange rate attitudes among 
firms operating in floating and in fixed exchange rate environments, respectively.  Tables 
4 and 5 use the LYS exchange rate regime classifications while Tables 6 and 7 replicate 
the analysis using Reinhart and Rogoff’s (RR) regime classifications.  Our expectation is 
that, in floating regimes, firm owners in internationally exposed sectors will express 
greater concern with exchange rates than other sectors.  Moreover, this concern will be 
muted in fixed regimes, as currency risk is limited.  We use sector dummies to proxy for 
―internationally exposed‖: MANUFACTURING, TRADABLE (manufacturing + 
agriculture), and EXPORTER.  In Models 1-4, we include the following variety firm- and 
country-level control variables:   17 
  GOVERNMENT OWNED (1=yes, 0=no) 
  SIZE  (1=small (5-50 employees); 2=medium (51-500 employees) 3=large (>500 
employees) 
  LOG GDP/CAPITA (avg. 1997-1999) 
  M3/GDP (avg 1997-1999) 
  LOG FDI STOCK/CAPITA (avg. 1997-1999) 
 
In Tables 4-7, the coefficients for our variables of interest largely confirm our 
priors: in floating regimes, manufacturers and tradables producers are more likely to 
express concern about the exchange rate than firms in other sectors.  In fixed regimes, by 
contrast, the internationally exposed sectors are less likely to report that the exchange rate 
represents a problem for their businesses, although the estimates are not statistically 
significant in the fixed-regime sample.  Note that nontradables are the complement of the 
set of tradables, so the value of the estimated coefficient on nontradables is the same as 
for TRADABLE, but with the opposite sign.  Thus, nontradables (services + 
construction) are less likely to be concerned about the exchange rates in floats. 
The results on TRADABLE are not significant because attitudes toward a floating 
exchange rate among firms in agriculture appear not to coincide with those of 
manufacturing firms. Run separately (but not reported), the dummy for AGRICULTURE 
is negative and significant in floats and positive (though not significant) in fixed regimes, 
which is exactly the opposite of the results for MANUFACTURING.  We speculate that 
firm owners in the agricultural sector are less concerned about the exchange rate in floats 
because agriculture has long been highly protected in most national economies.  In 
addition, much farm output may be in traditional products or goods that do not enter 
readily into world trade (perishable or delicate produce, for example).  Trade barriers and 
other transport restrictions may thus insulate food producers from the vicissitudes of 
exchange rate variation in floating regimes.   18 
The negative and significant effect of GOVERNMENT OWNED implies state 
ownership reduces managers’ apprehensions about the exchange rate.  It is difficult to see 
this variable as a proxy for the non-traded sector, however, since the simple correlation 
between GOVERNMENT OWNED and SERVICES is small and negative (- .062).  In 
fact, state ownership does not correlate strongly or positively with any other stand-in for 
―internationally sheltered‖ sector.  Therefore, we treat it as a control.   One interpretation 
of the finding that state owned firms are less concerned than other firms about the 
exchange rate is that they have a privileged relationship with the government that protects 
them from such forces.  They are ―sheltered‖ not so much from exchange rate pressures 
but from market and political forces of any kind, as the government stands ready to 
subsidize and protect them.  To test this interpretation, we estimated models of firm 
responses to a separate WBES question about the security of property rights.  Our 
findings (not reported) indicate that state ownership has a large and negative influence on 
property rights concerns among firms, and that this result is robust to a battery of firm- 
and country-level controls. 
 Our country-level control for the stock of foreign direct investment, LOG FDI 
STOCK/CAPITA, returns negative and (mostly) significant estimates in floating regimes.  
In other words, firms operating in floats with more FDI per capita are less likely to report 
that the exchange rate causes problems for their businesses.  One interpretation of this 
result is that foreign investors are more diversified across countries and currencies and 
thus less sensitive to volatility in the local currency. 
In Figure 5, we used the Clarify software from Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 
(2003) to provide substantive meaning to the ordered probit estimates from Model 2 of   19 
Table 4.  We simulated the difference in the predicted probabilities of manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing firms’ responses while holding all other variables in at their means.  
In this way, we isolated the impact of ―international exposure,‖ as proxied by being in the 
manufacturing sector, on firm managers’ concern with the exchange rate.  The effect is 
meaningful and significant for all categories of the response except ―moderate obstacle.‖  
For example, in floating regimes, the simulated difference in the probability that a firm in 
the sheltered, non-manufacturing sector says the exchange rate is a ―major obstacle‖ is 7 
percentage points lower than that of a manufacturing firm.  
  Tables 8 and 9 test our claims about sectoral attitudes toward the level of the 
exchange rate.  To do so, we make use of interactions between our sectoral dummies and 
REER appreciation.  One of our goals is to test the proposition that internationally 
exposed sectors are more concerned with the exchange rate as the currency appreciates.  
In addition, we also hope to uncover the reason why producers in internationally exposed 
sectors express more dissatisfaction with exchange rates in floating regimes than in 
pegged regimes.  The interactions allow us to determine the extent to which the concern 
in floating regimes involves the level of the exchange rate, as opposed to its volatility. 
Tables 8 and 9 report the estimates of Equation 2 for firms operating in floating 
regimes, using the LYS and RR samples, respectively. We estimate the effects in floating 
exchange rate regimes because real appreciations are more likely in floats than in regimes 
classified as de facto pegs.  Policymakers in de facto pegs have demonstrated a 
commitment to both nominal and real currency stability; indeed, the mean of REER 
APPRECIATION among countries coded as floating by LYS is -.039, while it is just -
.002 among LYS pegs.  We thus test the expectation that internationally exposed firms   20 
are more concerned about the exchange rate as the REER appreciates in floating regimes 
only. 
 In Table 8, Models 1-4 the signs of our internationally-exposed sector variables 
are positive in every model, as are the interaction terms: in LYS floating regimes, 
manufacturers, tradables producers, and exporters all express greater concern about the 
exchange rate as the real exchange rate appreciates.  Currency appreciation makes 
tradable goods less competitive both at home and abroad, which accounts for the positive 
and significant results on the interaction terms for manufactures, tradable producers, and 
exporters.  In Table 9, we estimate the same models using the Reinhart-Rogoff sample 
and find additional evidence that sectoral attitudes are conditioned by currency 
appreciation.  The interactions of manufacturing and tradables with real appreciation are 
positively signed and significant, indicating that firms in these internationally exposed 
sectors express greater concern with the currency as the REER appreciates. While the 
same relationship holds for the interaction of exporter and REER appreciation, the 
conditional effect is not statistically significant in this sample.   
Figure 6 provides estimates of the magnitude of these interaction effects.  Using 
Model 2 from Table 8, we simulated the change in the predicted probability of 
EXCHANGE RATE PROBLEM = 4 (―Major Obstacle‖) as REER appreciation moves 
from its minimum to its maximum value, holding all other variables at their means.  The 
simulations were performed separately for manufacturing firms (left panel) and non-
manufacturing (right panel) firms using Clarify.
14 
                                                 
 
14 Similar effects (not reported) were obtained substituting the interactions of REER appreciation with 
exporter and tradables.   21 
For manufacturing firms, the predicted probability that a respondent will report 
that the exchange rate is a ―major obstacle‖ increases by 25 percentage points (from .24 
to .49) as real appreciation moves from its minimum (-.31) to its maximum (.09) value.  
By contrast, such a movement has far less influence on non-manufacturing firms in 
floating regimes: the change in the probability of responding ―major obstacle‖ is just 8 
percentage points (from .27 to .35).  There is also much more uncertainty around the 
point predictions for non-manufacturing firms. 
Our final concern involves the relative importance of volatility and appreciation 
to firm managers’ attitudes about the exchange rate.  We found that in floating regimes 
internationally exposed firms are more concerned about the exchange rate than firms in 
sheltered sectors.  We also found that internationally exposed firms are more concerned 
than sheltered, non-manufacturing firms when the REER appreciates.  But what we 
would like to know is whether the heightened concern among international exposed firms 
operating in floating regimes is caused by the inherent volatility of exchange rates in 
these regimes or by the tendency of floating regimes to experience real appreciations. 
Some evidence for the magnitude of each effect can be extracted from the Clarify 
results presented above in Figures 5 and 6.  If we compare differences in the predicted 
probability of manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms reporting that the exchange 
rate poses a ―major obstacle‖ across these two sets of regressions, we can get some sense 
of the relative magnitudes of volatility and level, respectively.  From Figure 5, we see 
that, without regard to the level of the real exchange rate, the difference in the predicted 
probability that a firm in the sheltered sector reports a ―major obstacle‖ compared to that 
of a manufacturing firm is 7 percentage points.  From Figure 6, we estimate that, as the   22 
REER appreciates from minimum to maximum, the probability that a manufacturing firm 
classifies the exchange rate as a ―major obstacle‖ is 17 percentage points higher than for 
a non-manufacturing firm.  With the caveat that the interaction simulations are based on a 
truncated sample and are subject to wide confidence intervals that diminish the statistical 
significance of the sectoral differences, it would appear that appreciation in floating 
exchange rate regimes is the more important problem for firms in the internationally 
exposed sectors.   
Our results provide support for existing arguments linking the economic activities 
of firms to their preferences over exchange rate policy.  Manufacturers express greater 
uncertainty under floating exchange rates than do firms in sheltered, nontradable sectors.  
Manufacturers and exporters are also more likely to disapprove of a real appreciation 
than are firms in nontradable industries.  Whether and how these preferences are 
translated into pressures on policymakers, and into policy, is a matter for further analysis. 
Conclusion 
Many analyses of the political economy of exchange rate policy start from the 
presumption that policymakers must take into account the exchange rate policy 
preferences of domestic economic agents.  Such analyses typically posit that 
internationally oriented firms will be especially averse to the volatility associated with a 
floating rate, and will therefore prefer a fixed exchange rate.  They also typically suggest 
that tradables producers will be particularly averse to the relative price effects of a real 
appreciation.  Nontradables producers, conversely, are expected to prefer floating rates 
and an appreciated currency.   23 
The empirical evidence we present here supports these expectations.  Owners and 
managers of manufacturing firms, inherently more affected by the international economy, 
are more likely to regard the exchange rate as a significant problem in floating-rate 
regimes than those in the sectors that are not so exposed to cross-border transactions.  
This implies a preference of these more internationally engaged firms for a fixed 
exchange rate.  Similarly, firms in the manufacturing sector and those with export 
interests are particularly concerned by a real appreciation of the exchange rate; firms in 
nontradables sectors are less likely to demonstrate such concern.  This implies a 
preference of tradables producers, including exporters, for a relatively depreciated real 
exchange rate. 
While these results are hardly surprising, they do confirm theoretically grounded 
expectations about the policy preferences of important economic actors.  Further work is 
needed to explore more nuanced and differentiated aspects of exchange rate policy 
preferences.  For example, it would be important to know how such things as foreign-
currency liabilities, intra-firm trade, differential pass-through, and invoicing practices, 
affect currency preferences.  The evidence presented here is, nonetheless, a start toward a 
more rigorous and precise sense of the economic interests and attitudes with which 
policymakers contend.  24 
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Figure 5: Substantive Effect of Sector (Manufacturing vs. Non-Manufacturing)  




Notes:  This figure shows the change in the predicted probabilities of firms’ responses to a 
change in firm sector from non-manufacturing to manufacturing, holding all other variables at 
their means.  The simulations were performed on Model 2 from Table 4, using the Clarify 
software (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003). The first differences for ―no obstacle,‖ ―minor 
obstacle,‖ and ―major obstacle‖ are significant at the 1 percent level. The difference for the 
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Figure 6: Exchange Rate Appreciation: Manufacturing vs. Non-Manufacturing 




Notes: These figures illustrate the change in the predicted probability that EXCHANGE RATE 
PROBLEM = 4 (a ―major obstacle‖) as REER appreciation moves from its minimum to its 
maximum value, holding all other variables at their means.  The simulations were performed 
separately for manufacturing (left panel) and non-manufacturing (right panel) firms using the 




































































LYS Floating Regimes, 1999Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
Table 2a: Correlation Matrix (Firm-Level Variables) 
 
 
 Table 2b: Correlation Matrix (Country-Level Variables) 
 
*Significant at 1%. 
 Table 3a: Data by Country, Floating Exchange Rate Regime in 1999 (LYS Classification) 
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Notes: Reinhart-Rogoff floats include cases of managed floating (which includes a de facto crawling band that is narrower than or 
equal to ±5% and a moving band that is narrower than or equal to ±2%), and freely floating.  We drop Indonesia from the RR float 
sample because, in the aftermath of the currency crisis, firms from all sectors found the exchange rate a problem in Indonesia in 1999, 
making it difficult to tease out any sectoral distinctions. 





Notes: Ordered probit analysis of EXCHANGE RATE PROBLEM, a discrete, ordered 
dependant variable of firm managers’ responses to the question, "How problematic is the 
exchange rate for the operation and growth of your business?" (1 = "No Obstacle," 2 = 
―Minor Obstacle,‖ 3 = ―Moderate Obstacle,‖ 4 = "Major Obstacle.").  Robust standard 
errors, clustered by country, are in parentheses.  ***, **, * indicate statistical significance 
levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively.   36 
Table 5: Exchange Rate Attitudes in FIXED-RATE Regimes (LYS Classification) 
 
 
Notes: Ordered probit analysis of EXCHANGE RATE PROBLEM, a discrete, ordered 
dependant variable of firm managers’ responses to the question, "How problematic is the 
exchange rate for the operation and growth of your business?" (1 = "No Obstacle," 2 = 
―Minor Obstacle,‖ 3 = ―Moderate Obstacle,‖ 4 = "Major Obstacle.").  Robust standard 
errors, clustered by country, are in parentheses.  ***, **, * indicate statistical significance 
levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively.   37 
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